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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to develop a model that explains how
the consumption of some additive substances a⁄ects an individ-
ual￿ s choice between risky alternatives. We do this by assum-
ing that some additives substances, speci￿cally alcohol, increase
individual￿ s present bias. As individuals that consume alcohol
show greater preference for the present and less for the future,
they would ￿nd risky choices with rewards in the present and
costs in the future more attractive. Theferore, an individual that
wouldn·t have accepted a lottery may do so after consuming al-
cohol and he regret his decision after the alcohol in his blood is
eliminated. We analyze the e⁄ect of two taxes in discouraging a
risky activity: a tax on the consumption of alcohol and a tax (or
penalty) if the future costs of the lottery are realized. (JEL D11,
D60, D81, D91)
Keywords: habit-formation, risk taking, alcohol consumption.1. Introduction
Addictions are normally associated with irrational behavior, as the
consumption of addictive substances is cyclical or explosive; their con-
sumption negatively a⁄ects the health of individuals and is related to
self-destructive and anti-social behavior such as violence, crime and un-
safe sex.
Most economists have focused on how the consumption patterns of
the users of addictive substances can be congruent with rational behav-
ior. For example, in their seminal article, Becker and Murphy (1988)
showed this to be true in the case of the explosive consumption patterns
of addictive substances by assuming that such consumption accumulates
a ￿stock of capital consumption￿that increases the utility from consum-
ing them. Similarly, Dockner and Feichtinger (1993) showed that the
cyclical consumption patterns associated with addictive substances can
be congruent with rational behavior by assuming that such consumption
accumulates not one, but two stocks of capital consumption, for example
an addictive stock and a satiating stock.
Other economists have analyzed the consumption of addictive sub-
stances by assuming that individuals are not entirely rational, their hav-
ing time-inconsistent preferences. In these models, taxing addictive sub-
stances can increase individuals￿welfare. Koszegi and Gruber (2002)
analyze cigarette addiction when individuals have present-bias prefer-
ences. They show that taxes should be higher in order to include the
￿internalities￿ that individuals impose upon themselves. Gruber and
Mullainathan (2002) use surveys on self-reported happiness to measure
welfare, and conclude that individuals who are predicted to be smokers
are happier when taxes on cigarettes are higher. However, with only a
few exceptions,1 economists have ignored the question of the apparently
risky behavior that is associated with drug and alcohol use. When in-
dividuals are under the in￿ uence of drugs and alcohol they sometimes
alter their behavior, often by choosing risky options they regret when
sober. These decisions generally maximize their short-term utility, but
are detrimental to their long-term well-being.
1For a review of the evidence of the e⁄ect of alcohol regulation on crime, see
Carpenter and Dobkin (2010).
2The aim of this paper is to develop a model that explains how the
consumption of some addictive substances a⁄ects an individual￿ s choice
between risky alternatives. We do this by assuming that some addic-
tive substances, speci￿cally alcohol, increase individuals￿present bias.
Models of present bias assume that an individual has a preference for
the present that creates time inconsistency (see O￿ Donoghue and Rabin
1999). Our paper extends the idea of present bias, allowing individuals
to endogenize their bias for the present via alcohol consumption. To
the best of our knowledge, this approach has not been used before in
economic literature. From a public policy perspective, this approach
provides important recommendations as to the best way to discourage
crime and the imprudent behavior of individuals under the in￿ uence of
drugs and alcohol.
Our model is founded on the psychological theory of ￿alcohol my-
opia￿ . This theory states that alcohol consumption a⁄ects individuals￿
behavior by limiting their ability to perceive more salient cues, that is,
those that are more visible and closest in time.
As individuals that consume alcohol show greater preference for the
present and less for the future, they would ￿nd risky choices with rewards
in the present and costs in the future more attractive. This could explain
the apparent increase in risky behavior of individuals under the in￿ uence
of alcohol, since the rewards associated with many lotteries are in the
present, whilst their costs are in the future.
Numerous psychological studies support the theory of alcohol my-
opia, and have shown that individuals are more likely to engage in risky
behavior when intoxicated with alcohol. For example, Davis et al. (2007)
￿nd that individuals that are intoxicated with alcohol are more attentive
to impelling cues such as sexual arousal, and less so to inhibitory cues,
such as sexual risks.
However, if alcohol consumption increases the importance of more
immediate cues and reduces that of less immediate ones, as alcohol my-
opia assumes, then the consumption of alcohol can also increase prudent
behavior if the associated risks are in the present and rewards in the
future. MacDonald et al. (2000) show that in sexual situations alcohol-
intoxicated individuals reported more prudent intentions than sober ones
when strong inhibiting cues were present. For expositional purposes, we
3will refer to alcohol only when modeling alcohol myopia. However, our
model is equally applicable to the consumption of other addictive sub-
stances linked to risky behavior.
We introduce our model of alcohol myopia in Section 2 by assuming
that as individuals consume alcohol, their present bias increases, that is,
they give more importance to the present and less to the future. This
could be interpreted as a decrease in individuals￿rationality, their being
less aware of the future consequences of their actions.
In Section 3, we apply our model to analyze the risk-taking behavior
of an individual that has consumed alcohol. We work with a two-period
model, although we include a third period where individuals don￿ t take
any decision, but can receive the payment of a lottery taken in the second
period. We analyze the e⁄ect of two taxes to discourage a risky activity
that the government wants to discourage: a tax on the consumption
of alcohol and a tax (or penalty) if the future costs of the lottery are
realized.
In Section 4, we discuss a number of extensions and conclude.
2. Model
In this section, we de￿ne an inter-temporal utility function for an
individual with alcohol myopia, leaving the analysis of the risk-taking
behavior for the next section.
We extend the utility function of inter-temporal consumption with
present bias used by O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003). Their utility func-
tion is given by the following equation:
U





where ut is the instantaneous utility of period t; ￿ is the standard
discount factor and ￿ represents the present bias (a preference for im-
mediate grati￿cation.)
In order to represent alcohol myopia, we assume that an individual
that has consumed alcohol has a present bias that depends on the amount
of alcohol that is accumulated in his blood. This term increases the
4discount of the future as the amount of alcohol in the blood increases.
Our extended inter-temporal utility function is given by the following
de￿nition.
De￿nition 1: The perceived utility function for an individual that
has alcohol myopia is given by the following equation:
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ai, where ai is the amount of alcohol consumed in period
i and w is the number of periods that the alcohol remains in the blood
after its consumption. In order to represent that higher consumption of
alcohol decreases the attention to the future, we assume that ￿
0 (At) < 0:
Although it would be more realistic to consider that the amount of
alcohol that has accumulated in the blood a⁄ects an individual￿ s imme-
diate utility as a result of the pharmacological e⁄ect it has, for simplicity,
we assume that alcohol a⁄ects the immediate utility, ut, only through
its present consumption.
Although the outcomes of a lottery are normally analyzed assuming
payo⁄s are paid in the present, many lotteries have outcomes whose
payo⁄s are paid at di⁄erent periods of time. For example, a lottery
might be to have unsafe sex, with one of the possible outcomes being that
of catching a sexually- transmitted disease, the health e⁄ects of which
are su⁄ered in the future. In the remainder of this article, we will use
lotteries over outcomes the payo⁄s of which may be occurring at di⁄erent
times. To make the lotteries comparable, we have to discount the utility
of the payo⁄s that occur in the future. In this case, the preference over
the lotteries will depend on the present bias of the individuals.
3. Alcohol consumption and Risk Taking
In this section, we apply our model to analyze the risk-taking behav-
ior of those individuals that consume alcohol. We work with a simple
case comprising two periods. In the ￿rst, an individual has to choose
how much alcohol to consume, and in the second, he has to choose from
a set of lotteries (L). We include a third period, which serves no purpose
5other than to allow for the possibility that the payo⁄s of the lotteries
chosen in the second period are paid in the future. In the second and
third periods, we assume the individual does not consume alcohol and
that his utility is given only by the outcomes of the lottery chosen in the
second period.
The vector of consumption in the ￿rst period includes two goods:
alcohol (a) and the numeraire (y) with the price of the numeraire being
one dollar.2 We assume that the alcohol consumed in the ￿rst period
remains in the blood during the second, that is, w = 1 and A2 = a:
We make the usual assumptions for the instantaneous utility function
u1(a;y): u1a(a;y) > 0, u1y(a;y) > 0, u1aa(a;y) < 0 and u1yy(a;y) < 0:
We assume that the utility derived from the consumption of alcohol is
bounded: u1(a;y) ￿ u1(0;y) ￿ X for any a and any y: We make this
assumption as there is a physical limitation in the quantity of alcohol an
individual can consume in one period. This contrast to our view of the
expected utility of some lotteries as the payo⁄s of some of their outcomes
can be very large or very small, as it is the case of unprotected sex and
crime.
For simplicity, we assume that ￿ = 1: We assume that individuals
have von Newmann-Morgenstern utility functions. Note that according
to De￿nition 1 the expected utility of a lottery that has outcomes paid
in the future changes with the amount of alcohol in the blood, as the
amount of blood increases the present bias; therefore, an individual that
would not have accepted a lottery may do so after consuming alcohol. If
this is the case, he may regret his decision after the alcohol in his blood
is eliminated.
In the second period, individual￿ s perceived utility from a lottery
L is the expected utility of the outcomes for periods two and three,
discounted for the present bias given by the amount of alcohol that the






pk(u(y2k) + ￿ (a)u(y3k))
2Given that the desicion between consuming alcohol and the numeraire are made
only in the ￿rst period, we will write them without any subscript indicating time.
6where pk is the probability of outcome k occurring and ytk is the
payo⁄s when outcome k occurs at time t. For simplicity we assume
that the payo⁄ of the lottery is given in the numeraire (y). In order to
be consistent with the instantaneous utility of the ￿rst period we could
allow the payo⁄s of the lotteries to be also in alcohol; however, this would
complicate the model unnecessarily. The utility from the outcomes can
be negative, as we want to represent lotteries that have a cost in some
of their outcomes.
For clarity, we will write the utility evaluated in the ￿rst period
as the sum of the instantaneous utility of the ￿rst period plus the ex-
pected utility from the lottery in the second. As the individual has not
consumed alcohol in the ￿rst period he perceives the following utility:
U1 = u1 + U2(0;L):
In order to solve the model, we apply the solution concept de￿ned by
O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999) to our two-period model. This concept￿
the ￿perception-perfect strategy￿ ￿ is one in which an individual chooses
his optimal action in every period based on his preferences for the pe-
riod and his perception of his future behavior. Following O￿ Donoghue
and Rabin (1999), we analyze the extreme cases where individuals are
na￿ve or sophisticated and compare these with standard consumers that
have no present bias and whom we will refer to as temporal-consistent
agents (TC). As is standard, we regard na￿ve agents (naifs) as those
that do not realize that their present bias changes, in this case due to al-
cohol consumption, while sophisticated agents (sophisticates) are those
individuals that are fully aware of how their present bias changes with
alcohol consumption.
We de￿ne the perception-perfect strategy for the three types of agents
we are going to analyze. For a TC agent, the present bias is not a⁄ected
by the amount of alcohol in his blood; therefore, in the ￿rst period he
consumes the amount of alcohol that maximizes his instant utility.
De￿nition 2: a perception-perfect strategy for TCs is a strategy
(aTC;yTC;LTC), that satis￿es:
u1(aTC;yTC) ￿ u1(a;y) and U2(0;LTC) ￿ U2(0;L) for all a and y
that satisfy pa ￿ a + y ￿ m and L 2 L:
Although a naif￿ s present bias is a⁄ected by his consumption of alco-
7hol, he is unaware of this and behaves like a TC, consuming the amount
of alcohol that maximizes his utility for the ￿rst period, without taking
into consideration the fact that his behavior in the second period may
change. However, once in the second period, his present bias changes
and he chooses the lottery with the highest expected utility from the
perspective of his alcohol present bias.
De￿nition 3: a perception-perfect strategy for naifs is a strategy
(an;yn;Ln), that satis￿es:
u1(an;yn) ￿ u1(a;y) and U2(an;Ln) ￿ U2(an;L) for all a and y that
satisfy pa ￿ a + y ￿ m and L 2 L:
Sophisticates are aware that their present bias in the second period
is a⁄ected by their consumption of alcohol in the ￿rst period, and in the
￿rst period they consume the amount of alcohol that maximizes the sum
of their utility in all periods.
De￿nition 4: a perception-perfect strategy for sophisticates is a
strategy (aS;LS), that satis￿es:
U1(aS;yS;LS) ￿ U1(a;y;LS) subject to LS 2 argmax
L2L
U2(a;L) for
all a and y that satisfy pa ￿ a + y ￿ m:
In order to guarantee the existence of a perception-perfect strategy,
we assume that if an individual is indi⁄erent between both lotteries, he
chooses the one he would have chosen had he not consumed alcohol.
3.1 A Numerical Example
In this section we develop an numerical example to illustrate how the
consumption of alcohol a⁄ects the risk taking of an individual and how,
if he anticipates this, he will decrease his consumption of alcohol in order
to avoid taking a lottery he does not want to take. We assume that the
instantaneous utility function in the ￿rst period is u1(a;y) = a1=2 + y;
the income in the ￿rst period is two dollars and the price of alcohol is
one. We assume that the alcohol present bias is given by the following
equation: ￿(a) = 1=(1 + a). We work with a simple example of two
lotteries, the ￿rst with two outcomes whose payo⁄s are paid in both the
second and third periods, and a second that has only one outcome. For
simplicity, we give the payo⁄s already in utility values.
8The ￿rst lottery gives a utility of 1 for sure in the second period,
however, in the third period it gives a utility of -3 with probability of
1/2 and 0 with probability of 1/2.
The second lottery gives a utility of 0 for sure in both periods.
From the perspective of a TC, the second lottery is preferred to the
￿rst, given that its expected utility is 0, against -0.5 for the ￿rst lottery.
The perception-perfect strategy for a naif is to consume one unit of
alcohol in the ￿rst period and then choose the ￿rst lottery in the second.
A naif would maximize his instantaneous utility in the ￿rst period by
dividing his income equally between alcohol and the numeraire, and have
an amount of alcohol in the blood of one in the second period. With this
amount of alcohol, his present bias in the second period would be one
half and he would choose the ￿rst lottery (the risky lottery with future
costs), given that this lottery￿ s expected value has now increased for him
to 0.25, and the second lottery￿ s expected value continues to be zero.
The perception-perfect strategy for a sophisticate is to consume 1/2
of a unit of alcohol in the ￿rst period and to choose the ￿rst lottery
in the second. A sophisticate would anticipate that his consumption of
alcohol in the ￿rst period would increase his present bias in the second.
He knows that if he drinks more than 1/2 of a unit of alcohol he would
take the ￿rst and risky lottery. Given that he loses more by taking the
risky lottery than he gains by consuming alcohol, he would limit his
consumption of alcohol to just 1/2, enough to not take the risky lottery
in the second period.
3.2 Welfare
Welfare comparisons are problematic, given that the utility func-
tion varies with the consumption of alcohol. Following O￿ Donoghue and
Rabin (1999), we measure welfare using a ￿ctitious period 0 that repre-
sents the long-term perspective by weighting all periods equally (without
a present bias): U0(a;y;L) ￿ u1(a;y) + U2(0;L). Using this ￿ctitious
period 0, we measure the welfare loss as the di⁄erence in utility from
any deviation with respect to the optimal solution, which is given by the
perception-perfect strategy for a TC agent. For example, the welfare
loss for a naif is given by U0(aTC;yTC;LTC) ￿ U0(an;yn;Ln).
9In the following proposition we show that the welfare losses caused
by alcohol are limited by sophistication. As the example above shows,
a sophisticate would anticipate that his consumption of alcohol may
a⁄ect his valuation of lotteries in the second period, and would limit
his consumption of alcohol if the expected losses associated with the
consumption of alcohol are higher than the utility from consuming it.
This would limit the welfare losses for a sophisticate to the highest utility
he can get from consuming alcohol: X. However, for a naif, the welfare
losses can be as high as the expected utilities of the lotteries involved.
Proposition 1: (1) For any set of lotteries the welfare loss caused by
the consumption of alcohol for the sophisticates: U0(aTC;yTC;LTC) ￿
U0(aS;yS;LS), is bounded by X; and (2) for a naif, we can ￿nd a set of
lotteries for which the welfare loss caused by the consumption of alcohol:
U0(aTC;yTC;LTC) ￿ U0(an;yn;Ln), is higher than any constant C.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 suggests that the government should focus on policies
that bene￿t naifs, since the welfare losses for the latter can be much
higher than those for sophisticates.
In the following section we analyze two types of taxes in order to
discourage a risky activity. The ￿rst one is a tax on the consumption of
alcohol and the second one is a tax on the future outcomes of the risky
lotteries.
3.3 Taxes
As we mentioned earlier, individuals that have consumed alcohol
may choose risky activities only to regret them when sober. These are
lotteries with rewards in the present and costs in the future with a welfare
loss from the point of view of TC agents. The welfare loss of some of
these lotteries is so high that governments try to discourage them, as it
is with unsafe sex, driving under the in￿ uence of alcohol or crime.
In this section we analyze the e⁄ects of two types of taxes that try
to discourage an undesirable lottery. The ￿rst tax is a tax on the price
of alcohol (Ta), that is paid in period one and the second tax is a tax
paid if the future costs of the lotteries are realized in period three (TL).
The reason for assuming that the tax on the lottery is paid in period
10three as opposed to period two is that we believe that the government
normally ￿nds out if an individual as engaged in a risky activity only
when some of the future costs of the lottery are realized and because the
penalties the goverment can impose are paid in the future, as it is jail
time for a crime. For simplicity we assume that there is only one lottery
and individuals have to choose to take it or not.
The following proposition shows that a tax on the price of alcohol
reduces the welfare for a sophisticate, while a tax on the future costs
of a lottery with negative expected utility from the point of view of a
TC agent, increases the welfare of a sophisticate. The reason for this is
that a sophisticate is able to correctly predict his self control problems
and limits his amount of alcohol consumption in the ￿rst period, even
without a tax. A tax on the price of alcohol only increases the price he
has to pay to consume alcohol. However, a tax on the future costs of a
lottery with negative expected utility from the perspective of a TC will
reduce the attractiveness of the lottery. Anticipating this, he may be
able to increase his consumption of alcohol in the ￿rst period knowing
that he won￿ t engage in a risky and now less atractive activity.
Proposition 2: (1) A tax on alcohol weakly decreases welfare for a
sophisticate and this welfare loss is lower than X; and (2) a tax on the
future costs of lotteries which have negative expected utility from the
point of view of a TC agent, weakly increases the social welfare for the
sophisticate, and this gain in social welfare is lower than X.
In contrast to sophisticates, naifs can bene￿t from a tax on the price
of alcohol. Naifs drink the amount of alcohol that maximizes their in-
stantaneous utility without realizing that their risk choices are going to
be a⁄ected by their alcohol consumption. When the cost of these risky
activities is too high, tax on the future costs may not be enough to
discourage these activities, but a tax on alcohol may do it.
Proposition 3 shows that any tax on alcohol has a welfare loss of at
most X for naifs: However, the welfare gains from a tax on alcohol may
be very high, as taxes on alcohol reduces the consumption of alcohol and
may discourage naifs from taking lotteries with very high welfare losses.
11Proposition 3: (1) The welfare loss for a naif from a tax on alcohol
is bounded by X; and (2) the welfare gain for a naif from a tax on alcohol
is not bounded by any constant.
Our analysis suggests that a tax on alcohol is desirable compared to a
tax on the future outcomes of the lotteries that the government want to
discourage. Although taxing alcohol may harm sophisticates, the welfare
gains for naifs can be much higher than the harm for sophisticates.
4. Conclusions
In this article we have developed a model of alcohol myopia that ex-
plains some of the apparently irrational risky behavior that is associated
with addictive substances by assuming that these increase individuals￿
present bias.
However, certain aspects of our analysis should be treated with cau-
tion.
Firstly, as we saw in the introduction, the psychological evidence
shows that alcohol myopia not only increases an individual￿ s attention
to cues that are in the present, but also increases his attention to visible
cues. By not including this aspect in our model, we are providing only a
partial explanation of alcohol myopia, and omitting a number of elements
that could result in better policy advice.
Secondly, we are not considering the habit-formation aspect of al-
cohol consumption as is usually the case in the literature on addictive
substances. However, we do not regard this as a fundamental ￿ aw of our
model, since habit-formation occurs over a period of time that is longer
than that normally involved in an isolated case of alcohol consumption,
which is the case in the scope of our article.
Thirdly, we have assumed that alcohol myopia a⁄ects the bias to-
wards the present (the ￿ from the present-bias model.) However, alcohol
myopia could be modeled by assuming that the consumption of alco-
hol a⁄ects the discount factor (￿) in the standard exponential discount
model. In our three-period model, this distinction makes no di⁄erence;
however, in a model with more periods this di⁄erence may make very
distinct predictions. Nevertheless, we are not yet able to assume either
12of these is correct, since the psychological evidence on alcohol myopia
does not provide any information on whether it a⁄ects present bias or
the discount factor.
There are a number of future extensions that can be made. First, a
model with more periods would allow us to analyze certain aspects that
we have not been able to consider in our three-period model, such as
the ￿sophistication e⁄ect￿introduced by O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
This e⁄ect refers to when sophisticates are aware of their future self-
control problems and react by exacerbating them. In our model, the
sophistication e⁄ect would be that sophisticates anticipate that they
will consume alcohol in the future, and so conclude that there is no
case for them to limit their alcohol consumption in the present. Once
we consider this e⁄ect, it may prove to be the case that sophisticates
sometimes consume more alcohol than naifs.
Finally, we can extend our analysis to how individuals use the con-
sumption of addictive substances to diminish the anxiety associated with
the anticipation of future risks.
Appendix
Proposition 1: (1) For any set of lotteries the welfare loss caused by
the consumption of alcohol for the sophisticates: U0(aTC;yTC;LTC) ￿
U0(aS;yS;LS), is bounded by X; and (2) for a naif, we can ￿nd a set of
lotteries for which the welfare loss caused by the consumption of alcohol:
U0(aTC;yTC;LTC) ￿ U0(an;yn;Ln), is higher than any constant K.
Proof of Proposition 1
(1) Note that in the ￿rst period a sophisticate has always the option
of consuming zero amount of alcohol, in which case he would face the
same maximization problem as a TC agent in the second period and
therefore he would choose the same lottery. His welfare loss with re-
spect to a TC agent would come from the di⁄erence in utility from not
consuming alcohol in the ￿rst period, which is bounded by X: Because
the sophisticate has always this option, he would never choose a higher
amount of alcohol that gives him a lower overall utility.
(2) for a naif, we can ￿nd a set of lotteries for which the wel-
fare loss caused by the consumption of alcohol: U0(aTC;yTC;LTC) ￿
U0(an;yn;Ln), is higher than any constant C.
13(2) We prove it with an example: Because we assume that the in-
stantaneous utility function is continous and unbounded, we can ￿nd
a lottery that pays any payo⁄. Suppose that there are two lotteries,
lottery one, L1; that pays a utility of ￿(an) ￿ (2C + 1)=(1 ￿ ￿(an)) for
sure in the second period and zero in the third period and a second lot-
tery, L2; that pays a utility zero in the second period and a utility of
(2C +1)=(1￿￿(an)) for sure in the third period. In the ￿rst period the
naif does not realize that his consumption of alcohol a⁄ects his decision
in the second period and consume the amount of alcohol that maximizes
his instantaneous utility for that period: an: In the second period, the
naif, after consuming an units of alcohol in the ￿rst period chooses lot-
tery L1. The welfare loss for the naif for taking lottery L1 instead of L2
is 2C:
Proposition 2: (1) A tax on alcohol weakly decreases welfare for
a sophisticate and this welfare loss is weakly lower than X; and (2) a
tax on the future costs of lotteries with negative expected utility from
the point of view of a TC weakly increases the social welfare for the
sophisticate, and this gain in social welfare is weakly lower than X.
Proof of Proposition 2
1) Let￿ s call (aTaS;yTaS;LTaS) as the optimal amount of alcohol, nu-
meraire and lottery for a sophisticate when there is a tax Ta on alcohol.
Note that when there is no tax on alcohol the sophisticate has always
the choice of consuming the same amount of alcohol, and the same lot-
tery with a higher amount of the numeraire: (aTaS;yTaS +Ta￿a;LTaS).
Because the sophisticate has always this option, he has a weakly higher
utility when there is no tax on alcohol.
(2) The sophisticate has always the option of drinking no alcohol in
the ￿rst period. Because the welfare loss of this option is bounded by
X; he can always choose this option and avoid any welfare loss higher
than X from a tax on alcohol.
Proposition 3: (1) The welfare loss for a naif from a tax on alcohol
is bounded by X; and (2) the welfare gain for a naif from a tax on alcohol
is not bounded by any constant.
Proof of Proposition 3
We probe it by showing that a tax on alcohol reduces the welfare in
14the ￿rst period at most in X and show that it may increase the welfare
of the lottery choosen in the second period, as individuals that consume
less alcohol choose lotteries that have a higher utility from the point of
view of the TC agents.
First period. A naif consumes the amount of alcohol that maximizes
his utility in the ￿rst period. This amount of alcohol is given by the
following ￿rst order conditions: u0(an) = pa when there is no tax and
u0(aTan) = pa+Ta when there is a tax Ta on the price of alcohol. Because
u(a) is a decreasing function on a, an ￿ aTan:
In the ￿rst period, as the tax on alcohol moves the naif from his op-
timal consumption of alcohol, his utility decreases. However, he always
has he option of not consuming alcohol and not paying any tax, in which
case his utility decreases in at most X. Because the naif has always this
option, he cannot do worst than this.
Second period. Now we show that a tax on alcohol weakly increases
the welfare from the lottery choosen en the second period.
Let￿ s call xi as the expected utility of all the payo⁄s of lottery i
paid in the second period (as seen in the second period) and zi as the
expected utility of all the payo⁄s of lottery i paid in the third period
(as seen in the third period). If we call lottery La as the lottery choosen
by a naif after a consumption of alcohol a in period one, then we have:
xa + ￿ (a)za ￿ xi + ￿ (a)zi (1) for any i 2 L: If, after the imposition
of tax Ta; the naif consumes the amount of alcohol aTan ￿ an in the
￿rst period and chooses a lottery LTan di⁄erent than La in the second
period we have: xTan + ￿
￿
aTan￿
zTan ￿ xa + ￿
￿
aTan￿
za (2): By adding







za: If we add this last inequality to inequality
(1) we get that xTan + zTan ￿ xa + za and therefore the welfare from
the lottery choosen when there is a tax on alcohol is weakly higher as
compared with the case where there isn￿ t one.
(2) We probe it with an example. Suppose that there is only one
lottery, one that pays C ￿￿(aTan) for sure in the ￿rst period and ￿C for
sure in the third period. If a naif consumes a positive amount of alcohol,
he would take the lottery if there is no tax on alcohol, but he wouldn￿ t
take it if there is a tax on alcohol Ta. Therefore the tax gives a naif a
welfare gain of C ￿ ￿(aTan ￿ 1). Because this is true for any C > 0 and
15any tax Ta the welfare gain of a tax on alcohol is not bounded by any
constant.
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